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Introduction
Given the complexity of many legal procedures, e.g., in competition law, legal uncertainty is a major issue. With legal uncertainty, I refer here to circumstances where it is not clear ex ante whether a specific action is legal. 1 Previous literature has shown that legal uncertainty might deter the wrong actions -over-deterring socially beneficial actions, while under-deterring socially detrimental ones. 2 This paper shows that legal uncertainty inherent in a legal rule can advance the policymaker's objectives. Legal uncertainty allows mitigating the restrictions of the enforcement authority, in particular, its ignorance of individuals' private information. The enforcement authority uses legal uncertainty as a screening device. Therefore, some legal uncertainty increases welfare. Consequently, policymakers should not dedicate themselves to eliminating legal uncertainty from legal rules. When considering a new or a modified rule, there are more important considerations than the inherent amount of legal uncertainty. Legal uncertainty could even make a rule more selective and increase social welfare.
Suppose that a specific action increases or decreases welfare depending on the circumstances and the enforcement authority cannot perfectly distinguish between these circumstances. The enforcement authority chooses the optimal policy by setting a threshold on the aspects observable to the authority. Then individuals decide whether or not to pursue the controversial action. Finally, the enforcement authority imposes fines on individuals who are above the threshold and pursue the action. With legal uncertainty, some individuals cannot anticipate with certainty whether they are above or below the threshold according to the estimates of the enforcement authority. In particular, legal uncertainty increases the probability of a conviction for individuals below the threshold and decreases the probability of a conviction for individuals above the threshold. This uncertainty about the threshold of legality deters individuals with few gains from the action.
Individuals with large gains still pursue the action, especially if they are near the legal threshold. Hence, this uncertainty allows screening individuals according to unobservable characteristics. Therefore legal uncertainty makes the rules more selective and increases welfare. If individuals' private benefits do not enter welfare, e.g., in a consumer-welfare standard, welfare still increases, as legal uncertainty raises probabilities of conviction and reduces enforcement costs.
There are different reasons for this kind of legal uncertainty. For example 'it is difficult to predict . . . how an antitrust court will distinguish between 'predatory' and 'competitive' price cuts' according to Calfee and Craswell (1984, p. 968) . Alternative reasons are the existence of different procedures, measurement errors by the enforcement authority, different assessments of, e.g., efficiency defenses or uncertainty about what kind of evidence will be allowed. Consider two examples. First, vertical restraints, like resale price maintenance or exclusive dealings, are prohibited in the European Union under Article 101 (TFEU), formerly Article 81 (EC). 3 There is a Block Exemption Regulation, however, so that this rule does not apply if the market shares of the involved parties are below 30%. Although the European Commission gives guidelines how the relevant market shares are to be determined, it is extremely difficult to predict correctly the market share determined by the competition authorities. The causes are discrepancies in the definition of the relevant market, information asymmetries or imprecision in the measurement of sales, and other factors. This creates the kind of uncertainty analyzed in the model.
The second example is the case of Microsoft tying its operating system with additional software, in particular, a web browser and a media player. 4 In both instances the European Commission found an abuse of a dominant market position under Article 102 (TFEU), formerly Article 82 (EC). Think of a scale beginning with products where the bundling with the operating system is socially beneficial, as the integration allows for new features or higher performance and competing products are non-existent. On the other end of the scale are products where the bundling yields few or no efficiency gains, but competition is harmed considerably. While there is legal certainty on both ends of the scale, in the middle it is very difficult to exclude legal uncertainty completely. According to the model in this paper, this legal uncertainty could be socially beneficial. 5
A caveat applies here. Although this model points out positive effects of legal uncertainty, welfare effects need not be monotone in the amount of uncertainty. Furthermore, there may be negative effects of legal uncertainty that are not captured in our analysis. 6
Policymakers, however, might positively influence the effects of legal uncertainty and steer deterrence towards harmful behavior by complementing a general rule with specific exceptions, like safe harbors, or detailed information with respect to some procedural aspects. 7
The effects of legal uncertainty discussed in this paper directly influence the trade-off between per-se rules and rules of reason in competition law. With per-se rules, some clearly specified actions, like, e.g., certain rebates or resale price maintenance, are prohibited. A rule of reason, on the other hand, judges an action as illegal whenever the action is used in an anticompetitive way. Thus, the test of legality is whether competition was promoted or hindered. 8 Therefore an action may be legal in some cases, but not in others, depending on its consequences. Hence, rules of reason typically imply a certain amount of legal uncertainty. Recently, there has been a major shift away from per-se rules -exemplified by the case Leegin vs. PSKS, as the court's decision allowed resale price maintenance if it does not impede competition. 9 Also competition authorities in the European Union aim to pursue a 'more economic approach'. This approach focuses more on the market effects of the action under consideration. An example is the discussion of the European Commission about the enforcement of Article 102 (TFEU), formerly Article 82 (EC). 10 Previous literature has argued that rules of reason allow differentiating competition law in a more selective way at the price of some inherent legal uncertainty, because firms sometimes do not know whether their conduct is legal. Katsoulacos and Ulph (2010, p. 3) summarize this issue as follows: the 'legal uncertainty induced by effects-based procedures [i.e., rules of reason] is harmful and should lead [the competition] authority to favor per-se 5 Although both examples are from Europe, the results of this paper are also valid for the United States. In the United States, however, courts have frequently interpreted legal uncertainty in favor of the investigated party, thereby reducing overall deterrence.
6 For instance, legal uncertainty may reduce the possibility to control the enforcement authority, as it becomes more difficult to detect incompetent or corrupt behavior. In addition, legal uncertainty might result in socially wasteful expenses in safeguards and evidence production.
7 Ahlborn et al. (2004) and Christiansen and Kerber (2006) propose such modified or structured rules of reason.
8 Kaplow and Shapiro (2007, p. 54ff ) provide a good discussion of rules of reason in antitrust. procedures.' This paper shows that the conclusion depends on the kind of legal uncertainty.
Legal uncertainty could even improve the balance in favor of rules of reason.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature. Section 3 sets up the model. Section 4 analyzes the welfare effects of legal uncertainty. Section 5 shows that the main result is robust to the introduction of risk aversion, correlation, and endogenous fines. Finally, Section 6 contains the concluding remarks. All proofs are gathered in the appendix.
2 Related Literature Polinsky and Shavell (2000) summarize the literature on optimal deterrence. This literature, like, for example, Polinsky and Shavell (1979) , Shavell (1987) and Polinsky and Shavell (1991) , focuses mainly on optimal sanctions. With respect to legal uncertainty, the conventional wisdom is that legal uncertainty reduces deterrence and makes it more difficult or impossible to achieve optimal deterrence. Calfee and Craswell (1984) discuss the kind of legal uncertainty I consider here and Craswell and Calfee (1986) formalize it. In their model, however, there is no information asymmetry about the individual's type and her action. Therefore, legal uncertainty only hinders implementation of the optimal threshold of legality and either causes too much or too little deterrence. I show that legal uncertainty is beneficial and has positive effects on welfare. Polinsky and Shavell (1989) confirm that legal uncertainty lowers deterrence, because expected sanctions are reduced and less suits are brought to court. Schinkel and Tuinstra (2006) apply this reasoning to competition law. They consider type I and type II errors of the enforcement authority demonstrating that both lower deterrence.
In a different approach, Kaplow (1995) assumes mutual ignorance about the nature of the considered action, because individuals do not know the exact rules and the enforcement authority does not know the specific circumstances of the individual. Therefore both parties have to invest if they want to get the missing information. Thus, Kaplow (1995) models the trade-off between compliance costs and selectivity of rules. He shows that compliance costs are often low, even for quite complex rules. There is no legal uncertainty, however, if an individual decides to invest in learning the rules.
The beneficial effects of legal uncertainty have appeared in different contexts. Choné and Linnemer (2008) study the effect of uncertain efficiency gains on merger control. They characterize the market structure and demand elasticities that make such uncertainty beneficial. Strausz (2011) points out that regulatory risk might be advantageous and studies the necessary market structures. Lang and Wambach (2013) show for insurance fraud that uncertainty about enforcement might have a beneficial deterrence effect. Furthermore, the deterrence effect of uncertainty is already used in tax enforcement. According to Reinganum and Wilde (1988, p. 794) 
Enforcement Model
An enforcement authority faces a continuum of risk-neutral individuals with mass one.
The assumption of risk-neutral individuals seems most appropriate when firms are concerned. I will consider risk-averse individuals in Section 5.1. The authority's objective is to maximize welfare, i.e., the sum of externalities and individuals' private benefits, weighting the individuals' private benefits by α ∈ [0, 1]. 11 The enforcement authority sets its policy by choosing an enforcement parameterx ∈ R.x captures the threshold of legality.
In the first example of vertical restraints this is a specific market share of 30% for the block exemption. Every individual has the binary choice whether to take an action, like, e.g., speeding, a parking violation, or a red-light running violation or to abstain from it.
Depending on her choice, I refer to an individual as active or deterred.
The pay-offs of the action depend on the individual's type (x, b) that is two-dimensional.
The individual knows her type (x, b) in both dimensions. The first dimension x captures the aspects that the enforcement authority can observe with its auditing technology. Returning to my examples from the introduction, this refers to the market structure, like, for example, market shares in the case of vertical restraints. In the case of Microsoft, x denotes the kind of software added to the operation system and whether the integration is socially beneficial or harmful. x is drawn from a distribution F on R with a twice dif- by the twice differentiable function e(·). Thus, weighted welfare changes by αb − e(x). The first dimension of the individual's type x is ordered in such a way that a higher x signifies higher social harm, i.e., e (x) > 0. For some types taking the action is socially beneficial and for some it is socially harmful. Hence, there is ax ∈ R, such that e(x) < 0 for all x <x and e(x) > 0 for all x >x. There are many examples for actions with positive or negative externalities. Price reductions, e.g., might reflect lower costs or an attempt at predatory pricing. The same holds for bidding patterns in procurement contests or standardization efforts, which might have beneficial effects or be part of some collusive agreement in order to harm other market participants. In the case of vertical restraints, a simplification would be to consider only the market shares. If these are very low, the restraints do not harm other market participants, e(x) < 0. Vertical restraints, however, could be very harmful, e(x) > 0, if the firms involved dominate the respective markets.
In the case of Microsoft, e(x) > 0 , on the one hand, corresponds to implementing a web browser in order to acquire a dominant position in the browser market by abusing its dominance in the market for operating systems. e(x) < 0, on the other hand, corresponds to integrating new and socially beneficial features, like a basic firewall, touchscreen support or improved USB drivers.
As a benchmark consider the first-best policy, where the individual's type is observable and verifiable. In this case an individual of type (x, b) should be active, whenever
αb − e(x) ≥ 0 or, equivalently, b ≥ e(x)/α. Then only the individuals depicted in Figure 1 are active and take the action. In the model the enforcement authority cannot perfectly observe and verify the individuals' type. In particular, the enforcement authority can only use the observable aspects, i.e., the first dimension, of their type. It does so by setting a threshold of legalityx. If the enforcement authority finds individuals to have x belowx, their actions may well be socially efficient and therefore the enforcement authority allows make the individual pay a fine p with p >b. 13 Yet for this purpose, the enforcement authority has to invest resources to produce evidence. The enforcement authority can make the observed x verifiable at costs κ with κ ≤ (1 − α)p and κ < p. The costs κ capture experts' testimonies, reports and other expenses to prove the enforcement authority's case.
Alternatively, Polinsky and Shavell (2000) call κ the costs of imposing the fine. Figure 2 summarizes the timing of the model.
The auditing technology of the enforcement authority scrutinizes an exogenously given fraction a of all individuals with 0 < a ≤b/p. Yet, the auditing technology is imperfect.
The enforcement authority does not learn the second dimension b of the type. In addition, it does not learn the first dimension x of the type exactly, but receives only a noisy signal
with a differentiable density h(·) > > 0. In the case of vertical restraints this captures the difficulty in determining, whether the market share is 29% or 31%. With Microsoft the uncertainty might arise for products, like anti-virus software, where tying might offer great benefits, but also has the potential to harm other market participants considerably.
This uncertainty about the threshold of legality or this measurement error is implied by the structure of the legal rules and is exogenous to the enforcement authority. Therefore the case without legal uncertainty, i.e., ∆ = 0, serves only as a benchmark.
To sum up, the change in weighted welfare is
if the individual (x, b) is active and not fined
is active and fined
• At t = 0, the enforcement authority announces the policyx.
• At t = 1, the individual's type (x, b) is realized and revealed to the individual.
• At t = 2, the individual chooses whether to take the action.
• At t = 3, the enforcement authority learns the signal x M if an individual is audited.
• At t = 4, the individual has to pay the fine p if illegal behavior was detected and the enforcement authority pursues the claim at costs κ.
?
Figure 2: The Timing of the Model with the weighted private benefits αb, the externalities e(x), the welfare effect (1 − α)p of imposing a fine, and the enforcement costs κ. The individual's pay-offs are
is active and fined.
To guarantee an interior solution of the enforcement authority's optimization, another, more technical assumption is required:
for all x ∈ R, which is equivalent to the slope of the externality function being sufficiently steep, such that the policy of the enforcement authority matters. It is easy to check that the second term is at least as big as the third term if and only if f (x) ≥ 0. Given the policy constraints of the enforcement authority, it usually cannot enforce the first-best policy. The next section shows that legal uncertainty allows mitigating the limitations of the enforcement authority. the cut-off is constant and equals the expected penalty ap. Consequently, the cut-off iŝ
Effects of Legal Uncertainty
Therefore legal uncertainty created by the imprecise measurement allows some screening of individuals. If they are close to the policyx, individuals with low private benefits abstain from taking action for lower values of x than individuals with a high value of private benefits. If the legal rules would provide complete legal certainty, the measure of the enforcement authority would be perfect, i.e., ∆ = 0, and the cut-off would be sharp.
Then below the policyx, all individuals take the action. Abovex, only those individuals with private benefits above the expected penalty ap will implement the action. Figure 3 depicts this pattern. The following lemma describes the effects of legal uncertainty on deterrence.
Lemma 1. Below the policyx, legal uncertainty (weakly) increases deterrence; abovex, legal uncertainty (weakly) decreases deterrence.
The enforcement authority chooses the policyx to maximize welfare W (x) which equals
The first term captures the region where the enforcement authority judges all actions as legal. In the intermediate region, there is legal uncertainty which decreases the probability of an individual taking the action while increasing its expected benefits. Finally, in the illegal region, activity is limited to the individuals with the highest private benefits.
Raising the policy threshold makes more individuals become active and raises the negative externalities. The optimal policy balances these additional externalities exactly with the expected private benefits and the reduction in enforcement costs.
Lemma 2. With legal certainty, ∆ = 0, the optimal policyx N is determined by
With legal uncertainty, the same considerations apply in expectations.
Proposition 1. With legal uncertainty, ∆ > 0, the optimal policyx is determined by
Notice that only the intermediate region (x − ∆, x + ∆) matters for determining the optimal policy. Deterrence in this region is determined by the distribution G of the private benefits and the probability of being convicted by the enforcement authority that depends on the distribution H of the error term. While the equations in Lemma 2 and Proposition 1 differ, the optimal policies for small legal uncertainty and for legal certainty are closely related.
Proposition 2. If legal uncertainty vanishes, the optimal policyx converges to the optimal policyx N with legal certainty, lim ∆ 0x =x N .
Now turn to the main result of this paper, namely the welfare effects of legal uncertainty. Legal uncertainty changes how many and which individuals are active as depicted in Figure 4 . These changes increase welfare if the uncertainty is small. Theorem 1. Legal uncertainty increases welfare if the uncertainty is not too large.
Consider the case α = 1 and κ = 0 here, while postponing the general case to the appendix. The derivative of welfare with respect to legal uncertainty equals
∂b ( 
according to Proposition 1. For sufficiently small legal uncertainty ∆, this first-order condition (6) implies that there is a type x 0 such that
Hence, the enforcement agency chooses the policy such that the gains of deterring additional individuals with private benefits below the externalities are balanced by the losses of deterring additional individuals with private benefits above the externalities. Suppose for the moment x 0 >x. Then the integrand g(b(x)) (5) is positive for x ∈ (x−∆,x)∪(x 0 ,x+∆) and for sufficiently small legal uncertainty ∆. Intuitively, an increase in legal uncertainty makes some individuals in x ∈ (x,x + ∆) take the action and some individuals in x ∈ (x − ∆,x) abstain from the action. This change increases welfare for each type x ∈ (x − ∆,x) ∪ (x 0 ,x + ∆), but decreases welfare for each type x ∈ (x, x 0 ).
Yet, this decrease in welfare is balanced by the gains for the types x ∈ (x 0 ,x + ∆). Formally, the first-order condition (6) ensures that the derivative (5) of welfare with respect to legal uncertainty is positive for sufficiently small legal uncertainty ∆. The case of x 0 <x is analogous. Consequently, some legal uncertainty increases welfare.
Finally, consider the effects of legal uncertainty on the optimal policyx. Whether legal Page 11 of 28 uncertainty increases or decreases the optimal policy depends on the curvature of the externality function and the mean of the image measureĜ(x) := G(b(x))/G(ap). This image measure determines the optimal policy in Proposition 1.
Proposition 3. Suppose f (x) = 0 for x ∈ (min{x N ,x} − 2∆, max{x N ,x} + 2∆). Then if the externality function, e(x), is convex and EĜ (x) (x|x ∈ {x − ∆,x + ∆}) ≥x, legal uncertainty decreases the optimal policyx. If the externality function is concave and EĜ (x) (x|x ∈ {x − ∆,x + ∆}) ≤x, legal uncertainty raises the optimal policyx.
If the externality function is convex and the mean is undistorted, the optimal policy decreases and prohibits more actions than in the case with legal certainty. Yet, if the externality function is concave and the mean is undistorted, the optimal policy increases and permits more actions. Thus, the enforcement authority adapts its policy to the uncertainty. This completes the analysis of the model. The next section shows that this analysis is robust to the introduction of risk aversion, correlation, and endogenous fines.
Robustness

Risk Aversion
When legal uncertainty concerns individuals, the assumption of risk neutrality might be problematic. Therefore suppose individuals are risk-averse. The risk aversion is represented by a utility function u(·). The utility function is increasing, strictly concave and twice differentiable. Without loss of generality, I normalize u(0) = 0. If individuals are concerned, the most plausible welfare standard is a total welfare standard corresponding to α = 1. In addition, I neglect the enforcement costs κ here, setting κ = 0.
The individuals' risk aversion changes the cut-off levelb(x) of the active individuals.
Risk aversion will usually increase deterrence compared to risk neutrality. In particular, an individual of type (x, b) will take the action if
If the inequality holds with equality, this equation implicitly defines the cut-off levelb(x) of the active individuals. As before, there is no deterrence in the legal region andb(x) = 0 for x ≤x − ∆. Additionally, the deterrence is constant in the illegal region and ∂b(x)/∂x = 0 for x >x − ∆. Hence, deterrence effects of legal uncertainty are similar to the ones with risk-neutral individuals. Therefore, the screening effect in Theorem 1 also works for risk aversion.
Proposition 4. Also for risk-averse individuals, legal uncertainty increases welfare if the uncertainty is not too large.
Formally, risk aversion is equivalent to an adjusted distribution H of the error term δ.
In the proof, this equivalence allows me to proceed analogously to the proof of Theorem 1.
Correlation
Return to risk-neutral individuals. Suppose now that the private benefits are correlated with the externalities generated by the individual's action. In particular, there is some The function z allows to capture non-linear stochastic dependence. Now we can consider the welfare effects of legal uncertainty in this setting with correlation.
Proposition 5. Also with correlation, legal uncertainty increases welfare if the uncertainty is not too large.
The correlation makes the distribution of the private benefits b depend on the level of externalities x. This change in the distribution does not matter for the result, as Proposition 5 shows. Remember that the relevant value for the screening effect is the difference e(x) −b(x), i.e., between the externalities and the cut-off value for the private benefits. Both remain unchanged by the correlation. Therefore the result is robust to the introduction of correlation.
Endogenous Fines
Return to the setting of the main model. Another question is whether the enforcement authority could replicate the beneficial effects of legal uncertainty by setting the fine p appropriately. So far the fine was determined exogenously by the law. In reality, there might be different legal and organizational reasons why it is impossible to differentiate the fine very finely. Neglect these restrictions for a moment and assume that the enforcement authority endogenously sets the fine p at t = 0. In particular, the fine is a function of the externalities x, the observed part of the individual's type. Then the policy of the enforcement authority is entirely determined by the fine, as the threshold of legality is implicitly defined by the fine. The enforcement agency's decision whether to impose a fine at t = 4 remains unchanged. I show that the optimal fine is discontinuous with a step.
Proposition 6. If α < 1, κ > 0 and there is legal certainty, ∆ = 0, the optimal fine
withx < x 1 and p * (x) determined by
The values ofx and x 1 are determined in the proof.
Thus, for socially beneficial types, i.e., with a low x, the enforcement authority tolerates active individuals by setting the fine to zero. As the threshold of legalityx is passed, a fine of κ/(1 − α) is imposed, because lower fines do not justify spending the costs κ to enforce a fine. Then the fine p strictly increases in x. Notice that there is a step in the fine atx.
This discontinuity is sufficient for legal uncertainty to increase welfare. The reasoning is similar to Theorem 1 as the screening effect still applies aroundx.
Conclusion
Legal studies frequently consider legal certainty as a value in itself. This paper takes a welfare perspective and studies the welfare effects of legal uncertainty. I show that some legal uncertainty raises social welfare. Suppose that the legal rules do not specify the threshold of legality exactly. In addition, there is asymmetric information between individuals and the enforcement authority. The enforcement authority cannot observe the individual's private benefits of an action. With legal certainty, hence, the individual's decision whether to take the action is independent of the action's private benefits. 14 With legal uncertainty, the probability of a conviction depends on the distance to the threshold of legality. If an individual is close to, but below the threshold, there is some probability of being convicted. Therefore individuals with low private benefits do not take the action.
The legal uncertainty deters them. If an individual is close to, but above the threshold, there is some probability of not being convicted. Hence individuals with high private benefits take the action. The legal uncertainty encourages them to take the action. Both effects on average increase social welfare independently of underlying distributions and externalities. The effects are also robust to the introduction of risk aversion, correlation, endogenous fines and different welfare standards. Consequently, some legal uncertainty about the threshold of legality increases welfare.
Uncertainty about the threshold of legality might be due to imprecision in the mea-surement of the enforcement authority, missing precedents or unclear rules. In particular, the legal uncertainty is not by design, but inherent in the legal rules. I do not recommend designing especially ambiguous rules. The paper, however, points out that other criteria than legal certainty should decide about optimal rules. Even if rules contain some legal uncertainty, this uncertainty need not be a drawback, but might even increase welfare.
This insight is very relevant for policy and allows policymakers to design better laws.
Obviously, there are limitations to the benefits of legal uncertainty. Welfare effects need not be monotone in the amount of uncertainty. Legal uncertainty reduces the accountability of the enforcement authority making it more challenging to deter corruption or regulatory capture. An interesting avenue for future research are the dynamic effects of legal uncertainty. Legal uncertainty might give individuals incentives to experiment and therefore implement more controversial actions with negative externalities than under legal certainty. Yet, the costs of such behavior, e.g., possible fines, are incurred by single individuals, while the benefits spill over to all players, as they learn, e.g., court decisions reducing the legal uncertainty.
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: The derivative ofb(x) with respect to the legal uncertainty ∆ equals
Therefore deterrence increases for x <x and decreases for x >x.
Proof of Lemma 2: Suppose there is no legal uncertainty and ∆ = 0. Then the first derivative of welfare with respect to the policyx yields the following first-order condition.
The second derivative with respect to the policyx equals
Assumption (1) ensures that
for all x ∈ R. Therefore the second derivative is negative and the optimization of the enforcement authority is globally concave. The concavity guarantees that the first-order condition (4) determines the solution.
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Lemma 4 determines the derivative of welfare with respect to the policyx and legal uncertainty ∆.
Lemma 4. The derivative ∂W (x)/∂y of welfare with respect to y ∈ {x, ∆} equals
Proof: Taking the derivative of welfare with respect to y ∈ {x, ∆} results in
For y = ∆, I use the envelope theorem here. Notice that the conditional expectation equals
Hence,
Together with the chain rule, this results in ∂E(b|b ≥b(x))/∂y = g(b(x))
for y ∈ {x, ∆}. Therefore the derivative with respect to y ∈ {x, ∆} equals
Proof of Proposition 1: By Lemma 4 (p. 16), the first derivative of welfare (3) with respect to the policyx equals
with
. Hence, the first-order condition
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The exact threshold of legality depends on the distributions F , G, and H and the externality function e(x). It remains to analyze the second-order condition. Differentiating (7) with respect tox yields
For the second equality, add and subtract
∆ )e (x) within the integral. Notice that
Partial integration yields
for all x ∈ R. As T (x) decreases inb(x), this assumption ensures that −T (x)
for all x ∈ (x − ∆,x + ∆). Consequently, ∂ 2 W (x)/∂x 2 < 0 and the optimization of the enforcement authority is globally concave.
Proof of Proposition 2: According to Proposition 1, the optimal policy is determined by
Notice that ∂b(x)/∂x = −∂b(x)/∂x for all x and ,x+∆] e(x)f (x).
In particular, the left-hand side of (9) converges to
Analogously, integration by substitution of x by b yields
Finally,
Consequently, the right-hand side of (9) converges to
Rewrite condition (4) from Lemma 2 with legal certainty as
The right-hand side of (12) is decreasing and continuously differentiable inx. Therefore, (12) yields a uniquex N . Both sides of condition (9) are also continuously differentiable inx. In addition, the solutionx to condition (9) is unique according to the proof of Proposition 1. The previous steps have shown that
converges pointwise to the right-hand side of (12) multiplied by −f (x)G(ap) < 0. The convergence is even uniform, because ,x+∆] |f (x) − f (x)| converges to 0 for ∆ 0. Therefore, the optimal policy converges, lim ∆ 0x =x N , as the uncertainty vanishes.
Proof of Theorem 1: By Lemma 4 (p. 16), the derivative of welfare (3) with respect to ∆ equals
Denote the term in brackets by
decreases in x ∈ (x − ∆,x + ∆) for sufficiently small ∆ > 0, because the derivative of T (x) with respect to x equals
for sufficiently small ∆ > 0. The (weakly) increasing hazard rate of the distribution G of b implies a (weakly) decreasing inverse hazard rate. Therefore the term in brackets in Eq. (13) is positive as κ < (1 − α)p by assumption. As ap ∆ goes to infinity for ∆ to 0, the derivative ∂T (x)/∂x is negative for sufficiently small ∆ > 0.
Proposition 1 derives the first-order condition for the optimal policyx:
Remember that g(b) > 0 and ∂b(x)/∂x < 0 in the relevant range. As T (x) decreases in
x, this first-order condition (14) implies T (x − ∆) > 0 > T (x + ∆) for sufficiently small ∆ > 0. In particular, for sufficiently small ∆ > 0 there is a x 0 ∈ (x − ∆,x + ∆) such that
∂b (x) ∂x T (x) changing sign exactly once in combination with the first-order condition (14) yields
Notice that according to Lemma 1 the derivative ∂b(x)/∂∆ is positive for x ∈ (x − ∆,x) and negative for x ∈ (x,x + ∆). Moreover, ∂b(x)/∂∆ = x−x ∆ ∂b(x)/∂x. Assume for the moment x 0 ≤x. Then
for sufficiently small ∆ > 0. In addition,
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for sufficiently small ∆ > 0, because x 0 ≤x and
∂x T (x)dF (x) < 0 by (15). The case x 0 >x is analogous and therefore omitted. Consequently, for any ∆ > 0. Comparing the first-order conditions (8) with legal uncertainty and (17) without legal uncertainty, we see that the right-hand side of both conditions is the same if ∆ = ∆ and f is constant in the relevant range. Additionally, the right-hand side of (17) is constant inx N . Suppose that, in addition, e(·) is concave and
with the image measureĜ(x) = G(apH(
x−x N ∆ ))/G(ap). Therefore The implicit function theorem ensures that
as in the case of risk neutrality. Hence, this derivative ofb(x) is positive for x ∈ (x − ∆,x) and negative for x ∈ (x,x + ∆).
As e(x) −b(x) decreases in x, the first-order condition implies e( 
